Abstract. This paper describes improved methods for XTR key representation and parameter generation (cf. [4] ). If the field characteristic is properly chosen, the size of the XTR public key for signature applications can be reduced by a factor of three at the cost of a small one time computation for the recipient of the key. Furthermore, the parameter set-up for an XTR system can be simplified because the trace of a proper subgroup generator can, with very high probability, be computed directly, thus avoiding the probabilistic approach from [4] . These non-trivial extensions further enhance the practical potential of XTR.
Introduction
In [1] it was shown that conjugates of elements of a subgroup of GF(p 6 ) * of order dividing φ 6 (p) = p 2 − p + 1 can be represented using 2 log 2 (p) bits, as opposed to the 6 log 2 (p) bits that would be required for their traditional representation. In [4] an improved version of the method from [1] was introduced that achieves the same communication advantage at a much lower computational cost. The resulting representation method is referred to as XTR, which stands for Efficient and Compact Subgroup Trace Representation. As shown in [4] , solving the XTR version of a particular discrete logarithm related problem is equivalent to solving the same problem in its traditional GF(p 6 ) setting, which is as hard as solving the problem in the full multiplicative group GF(p 6 ) * . It is argued in [4] that XTR is an excellent alternative to either RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems using random curves over prime fields (ECC), because it combines most of the advantages of RSA and ECC without having any of their disadvantages. More specifically, it is shown in [4] that, with the exception of signature applications, XTR keys are much smaller than RSA keys of equivalent security, and at most twice as big as ECC keys. Furthermore, parameter and key selection for XTR is very fast compared to RSA, and thus much faster than ECC. Finally, for almost all cryptographic applications XTR is faster than ECC when random curves over prime fields are used; the exception is signature verification where ECC is slightly faster than XTR.
In this paper we describe three improvements to XTR. We present a careful analysis of Scipione del Ferro's classical method to solve cubic equations. As a result we are able to reduce the XTR public key size for signature applications by a factor of three if the field characteristic is not equal to 8 modulo 9. Because that is not unduly restrictive, it follows that XTR public keys are at most twice as long as ECC public keys for all applications of XTR. This is, in our opinion, an important enhancement of XTR. As a side result we get a method to find the trace of a proper subgroup generator that is 50% faster than the method presented in [4] . Finally, we give a much faster deterministic method for the same problem that works only if the characteristic is not equal to 8 modulo 9. None of these two improved XTR parameter selection methods is of crucial importance for practical applications of XTR, but the last method in particular makes implementation of XTR even easier. The resulting algorithms are all very practical and allow easy implementation.
In Section 2 we review XTR. In Section 3 we present Scipione del Ferro's method and the resulting improved parameter selection method. An even faster parameter selection method is given in Section 4, and the key size reduction methods are given in Section 5.
XTR
In this section we review some of the results from [4] . Let p be prime and let
. For n ∈ Z we denote by c n the sum of the n th powers of the roots of
It is shown in [4] that c n ∈ GF(p 2 ), that c −n = c p n , and that F (c n , h n j ) = 0 for j = 0, 1, 2. Furthermore, if p ≡ 2 mod 3, then p th powering in GF(p 2 ) is effectively free, and c n can be computed given c = c 1 in 8 log 2 (n) multiplications in GF(p) using a Fibonacci-like recurrence relation (cf. [4] ). The values c n−1 and c n+1 are obtained at no extra cost as a side result of the computation of c n .
It is shown in [4] that if F (c, X) is irreducible, then the roots of F (c, X) take the form h, h p 2 , h p 4 for some h ∈ GF(p 6 ) of order dividing p 2 − p + 1 and > 3. This implies that in these circumstances c n is of the form T r(h n ), where T r(y) = y + y
is the trace over GF(p 2 ) of y ∈ GF(p 6 ), i.e., the sum of the conjugates over GF(p 2 ) of y. The trace over GF(p 2 ) is GF(p 2 )-linear. Vice versa, it is shown that the minimal polynomial of any h ∈ GF(p 6 ) of order dividing p 2 − p + 1 and > 3 is equal to F (T r(h), X), illustrating the fundamental idea of XTR that for such h the trace value fully specifies h's minimal polynomial, and thus the conjugates of h.
Let g ∈ GF(p 6 ) have order q for a prime q > 3 dividing p 2 − p + 1. It follows from the results cited above that T r(g n ) ∈ GF(p 2 ) and F (T r(g n ), g n ) = 0 for any n. Furthermore, if p ≡ 2 mod 3 then T r(g n ) can be computed given T r(g) in 8 log 2 (n) multiplications in GF(p), which is almost three times faster than computing g n from g using traditional exponentiation methods. Thus, in XTR we replace powers of g by their traces, thereby saving a factor of three both in storage and in computing time. Note that an actual representation of g is not required, and that it suffices to have its trace T r(g). Given T r(g), the order q subgroup generated by (the unknown) g is called the XTR group.
XTR parameter selection is the problem of finding primes p and q such that q divides p 2 − p + 1, q > 3, p ≡ 2 mod 3, and p ≡ 3 mod 4, and the trace T r(g) of a generator of the XTR group. The primes p and q of appropriate sizes can be found using either of the two methods given in [4] . To find a proper T r(g) it suffices to find c ∈ GF(p
is irreducible, such that c (p 2 −p+1)/q = 3, and to put T r(g) = c (p 2 −p+1)/q (cf. [4] ). The probability that c (p 2 −p+1)/q = 3 if F (c, X) is irreducible is only 1/q, so usually the first irreducible F (c, X) works. In Section 3 we describe a fast way to test F (c, X) for irreducibility (assuming a randomly selected c ∈ GF(p 2 )), and in Section 4 we show how irreducible polynomials of the form F (c, X) can be written down directly if p ≡ 8 mod 9.
The ability to quickly compute T r(g n ) given T r(g) suffices for efficient implementation of many cryptographic protocols. But in some cryptographic applications, most notably verification of digital signatures and authentication responses, values of the form T r(g a+kb ) have to be computed, for a, b ∈ Z, given T r(g) and T r(g k ) for some secret integer k (the private key). It is shown in [4] that computation of T r(g a+kb ) can efficiently be done if additionally T r(g k−1 ) and T r(g k+1 ) are known. Thus, whereas for many applications the XTR public key data consist of just p, q, T r(g), and T r(g k ) (for unknown k), in some applications T r(g k−1 ) and T r(g k+1 ) must be included in the XTR public key data as well. This considerably increases the transmission overhead for the XTR public key data. In Section 4 we show how this problem can be dealt with. First we show that T r(g k−1 ) (or T r(g k+1 )) can easily be determined as a function of T r(g), T r(g k ) and T r(g k+1 ) (or T r(g k−1 )). And next we show how T r(g k+1 ) (or T r(g k−1 )) can be quickly computed based on just T r(g) and T r(g k ), assuming that p ≡ 8 mod 9. Both methods impose very mild restrictions on the choice of the private key k and have no negative impact on the security of XTR.
Finding a Root of a Cubic Equation
We describe Scipione del Ferro's classical method (cf. [6] , page 559) to compute the roots of a third-degree equation in its full generality, after which we apply it to test the third-degree polynomial F (c, X) ∈ GF(p 2 )[X] as in Section 2 for irreducibility.
Algorithm 3.1 (Scipione del Ferro, ∼1465-1526)
To find the roots of the third-degree polynomial f (X) = aX 3 + bX 2 + dX + e in a field of characteristic p unequal to 2 or 3, perform the following steps.
1. Compute the polynomial 
The roots of
, and uw 2 +vw−b/(3a), where w ∈ GF(p 2 ) is a non-trivial cube root of unity, i.e., w 3 = 1 and
Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1 is in GF(p). The following four statements are equivalent. Proof. 1 ⇔ 2 and 3 ⇒ 2 are trivial. We prove 2 ⇔ 4 and 4 ⇒ 3.
Step 4 of Algorithm 3.1).
, with w ∈ GF(p 2 ) as in Step 4 of Algorithm 3.1, are the two other roots of f (X) (cf.
Step 4 of Algorithm 3.1), and all three roots are in GF(p 2 ). th powering in GF(p 2 ) followed by a p th powering (which is free in GF(p 2 ), cf. Section 2).
Lemma 3.3 For any
c ∈ GF(p 2 ) the discriminant ∆ as in Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1 of f (X) = F (c, X) is in GF(p).
Proof. It follows from a straightforward computation that
∆ = 1 − 2c p+1 /3 − c 2p+2 /27 + 4(c 3 + c 3p )/27. This implies that ∆ p = ∆ so that ∆ ∈ GF(p). Corollary 3.4 The polynomial F (c, X) ∈ GF(p 2 )[X]
Algorithm 3.5 (Irreducibility test)
, perform the following steps. 
Proof. According to Algorithm 3.1 the roots h
Adding these identities and using that α 2 + α + 1 = 0 we find that u = U/3 where 
where the last identity follows from h 0 h 1 h 2 = 1. According to Lemma 2.3.2.iv in [4] we have that F (c, h . We prove that U 3 − T r(g 3 ) ∈ GF(p) if and only if the first or the last case applies.
, and thus U 3 − T r(g 3 ) ∈ GF(p). If the second case applies, then w p = w and z p = z so that w, z ∈ GF(p). Now, if additionally U 3 − T r(g 3 ) ∈ GF(p) then w = z so that the polynomial X 3 − wX 2 + zX − 1 = X 3 − wX 2 + wX − 1 has 1 as a root. As this polynomial has root-set {h 0 /h 1 , h 1 /h 2 , h 2 /h 0 }, it follows that h 1 = h 2 , or one of h 1 , h 2 is equal to h 0 . As the order of h 0 divides p + 1 by assumption, it follows in each case that the same is true for h 1 and h 2 . That is, the first case applies (and we are in the situation that both the first and second case applies).
Theorem 3.7 Finding the trace of a generator of the XTR group can be done in an expected number
q q−1 (7.2 log 2 (p)+8 log 2 ((p 2 − p+1)/q
)) plus a small constant number of multiplications in GF(p).
Proof. The correctness of Algorithm 3.5 follows from Corollary 3.4 and Lemma 3.6. Because ∆ is a quadratic residue in GF(p) if F (c, X) is irreducible (cf. Appendix A) Step 3 of Algorithm 3.5 takes a ((p + 1)/4) th powering in GF(p) (cf. p ≡ 3 mod 4). Assuming that a squaring in GF(p) takes 80% of the time of a multiplication (cf. [2] ), Step 3 of Algorithm 3.5 can be expected to require 1.3 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p).
Step 4 of Algorithm 3.5 takes an expected log 2 (p) squarings and 0.5 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p 2 ), for an expected total of 3.5 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p) (cf. Lemma 2.1.1 in [4] ). Thus the total expected cost of Steps 3 and 4 of Algorithm 3.5 is 4.8 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p). According to Lemma 3.2.1 in [4] the probability that F (c, X) is irreducible for a random c ∈ GF(p 2 ) is about one third. Furthermore, it can be proved along the lines of the proof of the same lemma that for a random c the ∆ as in Step 2 of Algorithm 3.5 is a quadratic non-residue with probability 1/2. The theorem now follows with Section 2 and the fact that the cost of the Jacobi sum test to test the quadratic residuosity of ∆ is bounded by a small constant number of multiplications in GF(p).
Remark 3.8 It follows that a proper T r(g)
can be found more than 50% faster than described in [4] . Theorem 3.7 is however just a side result of a more important consequence of Scipione del Ferro's method, namely the key size reduction method presented in Section 5. Before we can present that method we need some other results that also lead to yet another, even faster, way to find T r(g).
Improved Parameter Selection if p ≡ 8 mod 9
In this section we prove that if p ≡ 8 mod 9 (but p ≡ 2 mod 3), then an irreducible F (c, X) ∈ GF(p 2 )[X] can be written down directly. This follows from a general argument shown to us by H.W. Lenstra, Jr., that applies even to the characteristic zero case. We present a simplified description that applies just to non-zero characteristics.
So far we have considered p ≡ 2 mod 3, because this implies that the polynomial (
is irreducible over GF(p) and {α, α 2 } with α 2 + α + 1 = 0 forms an optimal normal basis for GF(p 2 ) over GF(p). As shown in [4] this leads to a very efficient and convenient representation of GF(p 2 ) in which p th powering is free. Here we restrict the choice of p to p ≡ 2 mod 9 or p ≡ 5 mod 9, i.e., p ≡ 2 mod 3 but p ≡ 8 mod 9. For these p the polynomial (
is irreducible over GF(p), as follows from the well known result that the t th cyclotomic polynomial φ t (Z) is irreducible over GF(p) if GF(t) * is cyclic and generated by p mod t.
The multiplicative group GF(t)
* is cyclic if and only if either t = 2, 4, or t is a power of an odd prime, or t is twice a power of an odd prime, or t is four times the power of an odd prime that is 2 mod 3. Applying this to t = 9 and p ≡ 2, 5 mod 9 it follows that φ 9 (Z) = Z
Let ζ denote a zero of Z 6 +Z 3 +1. This ζ enables us to conveniently represent elements of GF(p 6 ), either using a basis over GF(p) or using a basis over GF(p 2 ). For the purposes of the present section we use a basis over GF(p) and write elements of GF(p 6 ) as
In this representation elements of the subfield GF(p 2 ) of GF(p 6 ) correspond to elements of the form a 3 ζ 3 + a 0 ; this follows from 3p 2 ≡ 3 mod 9 and a counting argument. The element
Since ζ 3 = α with α as above this implies that {ζ −1 , ζ −2 , ζ −3 } forms a basis for GF(p 6 ) over GF(p 2 ), using the representation of GF(p 2 ) as used in [4] . Obviously, the latter basis is equivalent to the basis {ζ 2 , ζ, 1} which we found convenient for implementation purposes. This basis simply leads to squaring and multiplication in GF(p 6 ) at the cost of 12 and 18 multiplications in GF(p), respectively. Note that one can move back and forth between the representations of GF(p 6 ) at the cost of a small constant number of additions in GF(p). None of the above bases is optimal normal. For the calculations in this section that is not a problem, since they had to be carried out just once. For practical applications of XTR it is not a disadvantage either, because in the key recovery application (cf. Section 5) at most three multiplications in GF(p 6 ) have to be carried out per XTR key recovery. Note that if p mod 7 generates GF(7)
* the polynomial (X 7 − 1)/(X − 1) is irreducible over GF(p) and leads to an optimal normal basis for GF(p 6 ) over GF(p) (cf. [3] ). We chose not to use this representation because it imposes an additional restriction on p without leading to significant advantages.
Lemma 4.1 The trace over
Proof. Because the trace is GF(p 2 )-linear it suffices to show that the trace of ζ i is zero for i = 1, 2, 4, 5 and 3ζ i for i = 0, 3. This follows trivially from ζ 9 = 1, A particularly convenient property of our representation of GF(p 6 ) is that it enables us to do several calculations without using the specific value of p. The following result is an example. 
With ζ 9 = 1 this reduces to
if p ≡ 2 mod 9 and to (ζ 4 + a)(ζ 8 + a)
if p ≡ 5 mod 9. If p ≡ 5 mod 9 the p th power of the former expression equals the latter, so that if p ≡ 5 mod 9 the trace of (ζ + a) Q equals the p th power of the trace of (ζ + a) Q when p ≡ 2 mod 9 (cf. Lemma 4.2). For the computation of the trace of (ζ + a) Q when p ≡ 2 mod 9 one easily verifies that
and that
With ζ 6 + ζ 3 + 1 = 0 the trace of
then follows from a straightforward computation and Lemma 4.1.
Corollary 4.4 If
is the trace over GF(p 2 ) of an element of GF(p 6 ) of order dividing p 2 − p + 1 and > 3.
Proof. If p ≡ 2 mod 9 it follows from Proposition 4.3 that there is an x ∈ GF(p 6 ) * of order dividing p 2 − p + 1 with the required trace over GF(p 2 ). If p ≡ 5 mod 9 it follows in the same way, after taking conjugates over GF(p) and using Lemma 4.2. If the order of x is at most 3, i.e., 1 or 3, then x is either equal to 1, α, or α 2 , since p ≡ 2 mod 3. Thus, the trace of x is equal to 3, 3α, or 3α 2 . For the first possibility, x = 1, a trace value of 3 leads to two simultaneous polynomial equations (a 2 − 1) 3 − (a 6 − a 3 + 1) = 0 and a 3 (a 3 − 3a + 1) − (a 6 − a 3 + 1) = 0; since these polynomials are relatively prime, x cannot be equal to 1. For the other two possibilities, x = α or x = α 2 , the corresponding trace values lead to a = 0 or a = ±1, respectively, which are excluded by assumption.
It follows from Corollary 4.4 with a = 2 and a = 1/2 that (−27α − 24α
2 )/19 and (27α + 3α
2 )/19, respectively, are trace values of elements of GF(p 6 ) * of order dividing p 2 − p + 1 and > 3. This leads to the following algorithm to find T r(g). The probability of failure of Algorithm 4.5 may be expected to be q −2 , i.e., negligibly small. If this is a matter of concern, Algorithm 4.5 can trivially be extended and include more 'hard-wired' choices for c (corresponding to a = 0, ±1, 2, 1/2). In the very unlikely event that Algorithm 4.5 fails, which so far has not happened in our test implementation, a different q and p can be selected. On average one may expect that Algorithm 4.5 finds the trace of a generator of the XTR group in about 8 log 2 ((p 2 − p + 1)/q) plus a small constant number of multiplications in GF(p). This is almost twice as fast as the method based on Algorithm 3.5 (cf. Theorem 3.7), but Algorithm 4.5 applies only to the case p ≡ 8 mod 9.
Key Size Reduction
In this section we show that T r(g k+1 ) and T r(g k−1 ) can be derived from T r(g) and T r(g k ), assuming the (unknown) private key k is properly chosen. Throughout this section let c = T r(g) and c n = T r(g n ) for n ∈ Z. We first show that c k−1 (or c k+1 ) follows directly from c, c k and c k+1 (or c k−1 ) using surprisingly simple formulas. T r(g kp 5.4). Thus, a single call to Algorithm 3.1 can be expected to require 5.3 log 2 (p) multiplications in GF(p), from which the proof follows.
We conclude that T r(g k−1 ) and T r(g k+1 ) do not have to be included in the XTR public key data (p, q, T r(g), T r(g k )) for digital signature or authentication applications, if 1. the owner of the private key has selected its private exponent k in the proper fashion as explained above, and if 2. the recipient of the public key is willing and able to perform Algorithm 5.6 to compute T r(g k+1 ) followed by an application of Theorem 5.1 to compute T r(g k−1 ).
To summarize, there are three options for XTR public keys used for digital signatures or authentication, namely to include one, two, or all three of the values T r(g k−1 ), T r(g k ), T r(g k+1 ). In some applications, e.g. issuance of a certificate by a Certificate Authority, it may be required that the relative correctness of these components can be verified by a third party. A method to do this will be published at a later date (cf. [5] ).
